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Reflections on the Technicolor Right to Association
in American Labor and Employment Law
PaulM.Secunda'
It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose his every associational
tie is to impair that teacher's right of free association .. ., a right which, like
2
free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.
INTRODUCTION

O

NE of the least understood of all labor and employment rights in the
United States today is the right to association. There are a number of
reasons for the enigmatic nature of this right. First, the "right to association"
is not found expressly in the United States Constitution, and therefore
has had to be necessarily implied from numerous provisions throughout
the Constitution. As a result, there is not one form of constitutional
associational right, but instead there are rights as diverse as the rights
to political association, workplace association, intimate association, and
expressive association.
Second, to the extent that federal constitutional protections exist in
the workplace for the right to association, they primarily apply to public
employees in the United States because of the "state action" requirement.3
This generally only occurs when the employer is a public entity like a
federal, state, or local government employer. Consequently, much of the
constitutional right to association that potentially applies to the workplace

I Jessie D. Puckett Jr., Lecturer and Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi
School of Law. I thank Professor Mathew Finkin of the University of Illinois for his generosity and support of this and other projects. All errors and omissions are mine alone.
2 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,485-86 (1960).
3 Nancy Levit, Preemption of Section 1983 by Title VII: An Unwarranted Deprivation of
Remedies, 15 HoFrsRa L. REV. 265, 290-91 (1987) (noting court holding that giving public

employees more constitutional rights "finds its justification in the 'state action requirement'
of the Fourteenth Amendment which mandates this result") (quoting Skadegaard v. Farrell,
578 F. Supp. 1209, 1218 (D. N.J. 1984)).
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only actually impacts twenty-one million workers or about 16.5% of the
4
American workforce.
Third, the right to association is most palpable in the private labor
and employment context in the form of the right to form, assist, and join
a labor organization, to bargain collectively with a representative of one's
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and
protection under federal statutory law, Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.' Nevertheless, only about seven to eight percent of the
private American workforce is unionized, 6 and perhaps slightly more is
seeking to unionize at any given time, meaning that these statutory rights
have far less influence today than in decades past.7 Additionally, Professor
Garcia has persuasively argued that even existing labor rights are currently
under siege in the current, unfriendly political and judicial environment.'
Finally, non-union private sector workers may try to secure associational
rights in the workplace through various state statutory and common law
schemes, like under the tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public

4 See U.S.

DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES 298 (2004-2005)
M. WEISBERGER & MARTIN

H.

(Table No. 453) (figure from

2002); JOSEPH

R.

GRODIN, JUNE

MALIN, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS I

(2004).

5 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2007). Furthermore, courts have long held that constitutional freedom
of association protection extends to activities in organizations such as labor unions. See Smith
v. Arkansas Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) (per curiam) (recognizing the existence
of constitutional protection for associations involving union activity); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945); see also Ruben J. Garcia, Labor's FragileFreedom of Association Post-91I, 8 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 283, 285 (2oo6) ("The right of private sector workers to picket, speak,
and assemble is protected, within limits, against governmental interference by the First
Amendment"). "The First Amendment does not, however, impose on public employers any
affirmative obligation to listen to, respond to, or engage in collective bargaining with a public
sector union or association." William A. Herbert, The FirstAmendment and PublicSector Labor
Relations, 19 LAB. LAW. 325, 341-42 (2004).
6 "While unions represented 36.5% of public sector workers in 2005, a rate that has
generally remained at that level since 1983, unions represented a mere 7.8% of private sector workers in 2005, half of the percentage they represented in 1983." Kye D. Pawlenko,
Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposalto Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 65 1,654 (2006) (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor,
USDL 06-99, Union Members in 2005 (Jan. 20, 2oo6), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.
release/archives/union2_oI202oo6.pdf) [hereinafter Bureau of Labor Statistics of 2005].
7 The overall union density in the United States in now 12%, but as recently as 1983,
rates were nearly twice as much. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department
of Labor, USDL 07-113, Union Members in 2oo6 (Jan. 25, 2007), availableat http://www.bls.
gov/news.release/archives/union2_ol252007.pdf ("The union membership rate has steadily
declined from 20.1 percent in 1983, the first year for which comparable union data are available") [hereinafter Bureau of Labor Statistics of 2006.
8 Garcia, supra note 5,at 284 (maintaining that, "the post-9/I I environment of fear and
insecurity has weakened labor's freedom of association through actions by Congress and the
President, and through decisions of the courts and the National Labor Relations Board").
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policy.9 By and large, however, these attempts have proven unsuccessful
in an American employment system dominated by the employer-friendly
employment-at-will doctrine.10
In short, although many different forms of rights to association exist in
the United States workplace, the actual coverage for workers is a patchwork
of protections that apply sometimes and not others, depending largely on
factors such as whether one works for a public or private employer and
whether one is in a unionized or non-unionized work environment. The
consequence of this state of affairs is that American workers may have
fewer rights to association than many of their international counterparts in
the industrialized world.

9 The Novoselcase provides an example where the court attempted to recognize a right to
speech and association for a private employee, Novose/v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 Ezd 894 (3d
Cir. 1983), but its ruling has since been implicitly overruled. See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop,
Inc., 963 F2d 611 (3rd Cir. 1992) (retreating from Novosets interpretation of Pennsylvania's
constitution); Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 199o) (disapproving of Novosels interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
Io Under the doctrine of employment-at-will, employers may terminate an employee
for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all, as long as the reason is not illegal (e.g, under
federal, state, or local antidiscrimination law). Similarly, the reciprocal right of the employee
is the ability to leave employment without giving notice to their employer. This rule evolved
from a treatise by H.G. Wood in 1877. Wood asserted:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof .... [An indefinite
hiring.., is determinable at the will of either party ....

H. G.

WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877). This
state of affairs is in contrast to the employment system in most industrialized parts of the
world where the standard for dismissal is just or good cause. See STEVEN L. WILLBORN, ET. AL.,
EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES &MATERIALS 199-201 (4th ed. 2007) ("The United States is unique
in the industrialized world in having at its basic rule that workers can be fired for any reason
without any notice").
I I One recalls here the criticism in Garcettiv. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2oo6), by Justice
Souter in his dissent concerning federal and state whistle-blowing statutes in the United
States:

[Sipeech addressing official wrongdoing may well fall outside protected
whistle-blowing, defined in the classic sense of exposing an official's
fault to a third party or to the public; the teacher in Givhan, for example,
who raised the issue of unconstitutional hiring bias, would not have
qualified as that sort of whistle-blower, for she was fired after a private
conversation with the school principal. In any event, the combined
variants of statutory whistle-blower definitions and protections add
up to a patchwork, not a showing that worries may be remitted to
legislatures for relief.
Id. at 1970 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439
U.S. 410 (1979)).
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This article will reflect on some of the various workplace situations
where rights to association are implicated and the problems of application
that derive from these scenarios. Some of these examples involve situations
where employees depend on rights to association to defend themselves
against arbitrary employer action and overreaching, but other associational
rights discussed below inhere in the employer and may be utilized to
exclude unwanted employees from an employee organization, thereby
undermining employees' rights to association further.
The solution seems to be for Congress to adopt a uniform federal law
to protect the associational rights of all employees in the workplace. My
project is therefore similar to the one undertaken by Justice Souter in
dissent in Garcettiv. Ceballos2 in the whistle-blowing/free speech context:
My point is not to disparage particular statutes .... but merely to show the
current understanding of statutory protection: individuals doing the same
sorts of governmental jobs and saying the same sorts of things addressed to
civic concerns will get different protection depending on the local, state, or
13
federal jurisdictions that happened to employ them.
To address these concerns, this article is divided into five parts based
on the different types of associational rights in the labor and employment
context. Part I discusses the use of the right to association to protect public
employees from political discrimination and other forms of associational
discrimination.' 4 Part II explores emerging intimate association rights to
protect workers' sexual privacy from employer interference." Part III then
turns the tables and considers how American employers may use the right of
expressive association to exclude employees whose mere presence implies
support for controversial or unpopular views. 6 Part IV then suggests a
federal statute, the Freedom of Association in the Workplace Act (FAWA),
which would better secure the basic freedom of association to all workers
7
and make uniform this most fundamental of civil liberties.'
I.

THE RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WORKPLACE

Although the right to association is not found within the text of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution," such a right has

12

13
14
15
16
17

Garcetti, IZ6 S. Ct. 1951 (2oo6).
Id.at 1971 (Souter, J., dissenting).

See infra notes i8-8o and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
See infra notes io6-43 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
18 U.S. CONST.amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a

2oo7- zoo8]

RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION

nevertheless been implicitly found to be a fundamental constitutional right
by the United States Supreme Court.19 In short, this is because the ability
to associate with others increases one's ability to engage in civil liberties
protected by the Constitution. 0 In this regard, the Supreme Court has
commented that an "individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to
petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously
protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed." 1
The actual scope of the right to association in the labor and employment
context is based on the notion, sometimes referred to as the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, that a public employer may not take adverse
employment action against a public employee on a basis that infringes
his or her constitutional rights.2 2 Thus, although many public employees
continue to be at-will employees, 3 they cannot be terminated, demoted,
transferred, or subjected to other adverse employment actions, for exercising
their constitutional rights.
At one time in its history, the United States Supreme Court held that
government benefits were mere privileges that could be withheld or
limited on any condition. 4 The American jurist, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, famously wrote in the employment context that a person "may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional

redress of grievances").
19 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("[W]e have long understood as
implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding
right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educaPatterson, 357 U.S. 449,
tional, religious, and cultural ends"); see also NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel.
461 (1958) (labeling right to association as an indispensable part of liberty on the same plane
as the rights to speech or press).
20 Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460. Professor Chemerinsky explains more practically that
because groups have resources in human capital and money, such groups enhance an indi-

vidual's freedom to engage in protected constitutional activities. See

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,

(zd ed. 2002); see also New York State
Club Assoc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. I, 13 (1988) ("The ability and the opportunity to
combine with others to advance one's view is a powerful practical means of ensuring the
perpetuation of the freedoms the First Amendment has guaranteed to individuals as against
the government").
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1113

21
22

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
Perry v.Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597

(1972).

However, a large number of public employees in the United States also have just cause
protection under either a collective bargaining contract or civil service laws. For instance, as of
2oo6,36.2% of public sector employees were union members. See Bureau of Labor Statistics
of zoo6, supra note 7. Additionally, many federal civil service workers may only be terminated
for cause that promotes the efficiency of the civil service. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2007).
24 See, e.g., People v. Crane, io8 N.E. 427, 430 (Mass. 1892) (per Cardozo, J.), aff'd, 239
U.S. 195 (1915) (limiting public employment to citizens on the theory that "[wjhatever is a
privilege, rather than a right, may be made dependent on citizenship").
23
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right to be a policeman.""5 But just as American case law has now made
clear that a rights/privilege distinction no longer exists,2 6 the Court has
also arrived at this same conclusion in the employment context. 7 For
instance, in the landmark public employment case of Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 8 the Supreme Court stated emphatically: "'[T]he theory that
public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected
to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly
rejected."'2 9
Thus, the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests--especially, his
interest in freedom of speech."30 As the Court observed in Perry: "For if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in
effect be penalized and inhibited,"'" and "'produce a result which [it] could
' 32
not command directly. '
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has also been thoroughly
explored in the First Amendment context as justification for greater
governmental power in its role as public employer. Justice Marshall
observed in Picketing v. Board of Education33 : "[I]t cannot be gainsaid
that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection
25 See McAuliffe v. Mayor and City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892); see also
Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 496 (1952) (finding "no constitutional infirmity" to a law
which required public employees to declare past and present Communist affiliation).
z6 See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (973) ("[T]his Court now has rejected the
concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized
as a 'right' or as a 'privilege"') (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,374 (1971)).
27 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967).
z8 Id.
29 See id. at 605-o6 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir.
1965)); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("For at least a quarter-century,
this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which government may not rely"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398,404 (1963) (in the unemployment compensation and free exercise of religion context
stating that, "[it is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may
be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege").
30 Perry,408 U.S. at 597.
31 See id.
32 See id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)); see also Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1, 1i (1972) ("[Clonstitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling',
effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise
of First Amendment rights"); Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 8o i, 8o6
(2003) ("The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions rejects the notion that the government's
power to grant a benefit includes the lesser power to attach any conditions at all to receiving
the benefit").
33 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."' ' And although
Justice Marshall in Pickering did not cite to any precedent to support his
assertion, the Supreme Court on numerous occasions since has affirmed
this view of the varying degrees of power that government has depending
upon the capacity in which the government is acting.35 For example, in her
opinion for the Court in Boardof County Commissioners v. Umbehr,36 Justice
O'Connor explained that a government employee's close relationship
with the government requires a balancing of important free speech and
government interests. 37 In such relationships, "[tihe government needs to
be free to terminate both employees and contractors for poor performance,
to improve the efficiency, efficacy, and responsiveness of service to the
public, and to prevent the appearance of corruption. ' 38 Similarly, Justice
34 Id. at 568 (emphasis added); see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S.
94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the
government in its capacity as lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private conduct, are not the
same as the restrictions it places upon the government in its capacity as employer"); Brown
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356-357 n.13 (198o) ("A governmental employer may subject its employees to such special restrictions on free expression as are reasonably necessary to promote
effective government"); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof ComparativeConstitutionalLaw, io8
YALE L.J. 1225, 1250 (1999) ("[A] balancing approach that would not be used when the government acts as regulator is appropriate when the government acts as employer"). For an
interesting conception of the different roles government play, see generally ROBERT C. POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995) (dividing the "social domain" into three parts: the domain of democracy and public discourse, the domain of
management, and the domain of community).
35 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 66I, 671-72 ('994) (plurality opinion) ("We have
never explicitly answered this question [about the government's dual roles,] though we have
always assumed that its premise is correct-that the government as employer indeed has far
broader powers than does the government as sovereign") (citing Pickering,391 U.S. at 568;
Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,564 (1973)); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 7 18 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We have ... no
one Free Speech Clause test. We have different tests for content-based speech restrictions,
for content-neutral speech restrictions, for restrictions imposed by the government acting as
employer, for restrictions in nonpublic fora, and so on"); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147
(1983)). See also Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Modelfor Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1465, 1497 (1999) ("Administrative efficiency is generally not considered a compelling
interest under strict scrutiny, which may be one reason that free speech cases have explicitly
adopted a more deferential standard for government-as-employer regulations, instead of purporting to apply strict scrutiny").
36 Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
37 See id. at 68o.
38 See id. at 674; see also Waters, 511 U.S. at 674-75:
62,

[T]he extra power the government has in this area comes from the nature of the government's mission as employer. Government agencies
are charged by law with doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees
to help do those tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible. When
someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to the agency's effective operation begins to do or say things that detract from the
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Powell explained in his concurring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy that "the
Government's interest, and hence the public's interest, is the maintenance
of employee efficiency and discipline .... To this end, the Government, as
an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management
'
of its personnel and internal affairs." 39
Last, in her plurality decision
in Waters v. Churchill, Justice O'Connor juxtaposed the two roles that
government plays by describing certain First Amendment doctrines which
could not be reasonably applied to speech of government employees, 4° and
by outlining the less stringent procedural requirements for restrictions on
government employees' speech. 41 This same line of reasoning generally
applies to the greater authority public employers have in impinging upon
public employees' associational claims.
Although it is generally agreed that the government has more power
to interfere with constitutional rights in its employment capacity,4 it is far
from clear how to assess which employment practices are permissible and
which are not.43 In order to get to the bottom of this thorny question,

agency's effective operation, the government employer must have some
power to restrain her.
See also Tushnet, supra note 34, at 1250 ("The government has instrumental or programmatic
goals within the domain of management. When acting there, it may restrict individual autonomy in the service of its programmatic goals") (citing C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures
and Free Speech, 33 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I, 16-21 (1998)). Indeed, absent contractual,
statutory or constitutional restriction, the government is entitled to terminate employees and
contractors on an at-will basis, for good reason, bad reason, no reason at all. See Umbehr, 518
U.S. at 674.
39 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (I974) (Powell, J., concurring). If it were otherwise, Justice Powell explains, the government employer would not be able to remove inefficient and unsatisfactory workers quickly and the government's substantial interest in so doing
would be frustrated without adequate justification. See id.
40 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion) (reviewing a number of First Amendment
doctrines that do not apply with the same force in the government as employer context, including instances in which the employer "may bar its employees from using Mr. Cohen's
offensive utterance to members of the public or to the people with whom they work") (citing
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 197 I)).
41 See id. at 673 (observing that although speech restrictions on private citizens must
precisely define the speech they target, a government employer is permitted to prohibit its
employees from acting "rude to customers," even though this restriction would be void for
vagueness under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence); see also Volokh, supra note 35,
at 1494-97.
42 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 (observing that the Court has "consistently given greater
deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech
than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large").
43 See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (noting the difficulty associated with the
Pickering balancing); Volokh, supra note 35, at 1495-97 (describing the test implemented by
Connick/Pickeringas sub-strict scrutiny); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L. J. 147, 204 (1998) ("The Court has
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the Court has adopted two specific legal analytical frameworks for First
Amendment association cases in the workplace:" one for political affiliation
cases and one for all other types of public employee associational claims.
A. Public Employee PoliticalAssociation Protections
Notions of political discrimination in the public workplace derived initially
from the Cold War era in a series of cases dealing with loyalty oaths.
Loyalty oath cases derived from the fear of the spread of Communism after
the Russian Revolution in 1917. During this time and thereafter, many
laws were passed in the United States which sought to limit the ability
of Communists or Communist sympathizers from gaining government
employment and undermining the government. 4s In particular, numerous
federal and state laws were passed prohibiting the holding of public
employment by those who refused to swear that they had not had any
connection with the Communist Party.46 It was therefore inevitable that
during the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union in the 1950s
that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions would find vitality in the
4
freedom of association in the workplace cases. 1
In these cases, the Court held that government workers were
constitutionally protected from losing their jobs for refusing to take an oath
or for refusing to sign a declaration about their political affiliation.4 For
instance in Wieman v. Updegraff,49 the Supreme Court held that government
workers were constitutionally protected from losing their jobs for not

acknowledged that 'such particularized balancing is difficult,' and this seems to be an understatement. From all we've seen of the lower court decisions, the test is essentially indeterminate in all but the easiest cases.") (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 15o).
44 Intimate association claims discussed in Part II primarily revolve around personal decisions pertaining to sexual matters outside of the workplace. See infra notes 81-Io5 and
accompanying text.
45 For example, the Feinberg Law, passed by the State of New York, provided for, inter
a/ia,removal from academic public employment for "the utterance of any treasonable or seditious word ... or the doing of any treasonable or seditious act." See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 593 (x967) (citing N.Y. EDUCATION LAw § 3021 (McKinney 1953)).
46 See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 185 & n.i (1952) (setting forth the provisions of such a loyalty oath for public employees in the State of Oklahoma).
47 Being labeled a Communist during the McCarthy Era was no small matter. See id. at
19o-91 ("There can be no dispute about the consequences visited upon a person excluded
from public employment on disloyalty grounds. In the view of the community, the stain is a
deep one; indeed, it has become a badge of infamy. Especially is this so in time of cold war
and hot emotions when 'each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy"' (quoting
Judge Learned Hand, Address at the 86th Convocation of the University of the State of New
York (October 24, 1952))).
48 See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,674-75 (1996) (citing Wieman, 344
U.S. 183; Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)).
49 Wieman v, Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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swearing an oath regarding their past and present political affiliation. 0
Similarly, eight years later in Shelton v. Tucker,"1 the Court struck down
an Arkansas statue which required, as a prerequisite for employment,
public school teachers to file affidavits giving names and addresses of all
organization to which they had belonged or contributed to within the
preceding five years."2 Finally, Keyishian v. Board of Regents 3 struck down
a New York state law because of its overbreadth with regard to public
54
employees' rights to freedom of association.
As loyalty oaths became less visible after the 1950s and 1960s, a second
generation of unconstitutional conditions in association cases came to the
legal forefront starting in the 1970s. Specifically, these cases dealt with
the so-called "spoils system," or political patronage, 5 which rewards public
6
employment based on loyalty to a given political party. In Elrodv.Burns,
for example, the plurality decision written by Justice Brennan found that
Illinois public employees, who were non-confidential, nonpolicymaking
employees, 5 7 could not be fired merely because of their partisan political
affiliation." In this regard, Brennan stated: "[Platronage dismissals severely
restrict political belief and association. Though there is a vital need for
government efficiency and effectiveness, such dismissals are on balance
not the least restrictive means for fostering that end."59
Four years later, a majority of the court upheld the major premises of
Elrod in Brantiv. Finkel.60 There, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
similarly noted that assistant public defenders were nonconfidential,
nonpolicymaking officials whose employment could not be terminated

50 See id.at 192 ("We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory").
51 Shelton v.Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (196o).
52 Id. at 485-86 ("It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right to free association, .. . a right which, like free speech,
lies at the foundation of a free society").
53 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
54 Id. at 609 (striking down New York law as overbroad because it barred public "employment both for association which legitimately may be proscribed and for association which
may not be proscribed consistent with First Amendment rights").
55 For a well-known literary portrayal of the political spoils system, see W. RIoROON,
PLuNKITr OF TMMANY HALL (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1948).
56 Elrod v.Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
57 If a public employee is either confidential or a policymaker, there is a general agreement that public officials may rely on party affiliation in appointing these high level officials.
See id. at 367.
58 Id. at 372-73.
59 Id. at 372.

60 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (198o).
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solely based on their partisan political affiliation. 6' Relying specifically
upon the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the Court found that "[i]f
the First Amendment protects a public employee from discharge on what
'6
he [says], it must also protect him from discharge on what he believes.
Moreover, Justice Stevens found that the facts of the case fell clearly within
the holding of Perry v. Sindermann that the government "may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests. ' 63
More recently, in Rutan v. RepublicanParty ofIllinois,64 the Supreme Court
extended the holding of Elrod and Branti to other adverse employment
decisions such as failures to hire, rehire, transfer, or promote. 61 Writing for
the Court once again, Justice Brennan found that the Illinois Governor's
practice of limiting state employment and beneficial employment-related
decisions to those who supported the Republican Party unconstitutionally
impinged on Democrats' rights to association. 66 Nevertheless, the Court
emphasized that its holding applied only to non-policymaking employees
and that a government employer is still permitted to terminate policymaking
workers for their political beliefs. At these higher levels, government
decisionmakers are allowed to politically discriminate to ensure loyalty to
the governing party's political agenda.
In short, many public employees are provided substantial protection in
the workplace for their political associations.
B. Public Employee Workplace Association Protections
Whereas the cases discussed in the previous section protect government
workers in their political affiliations, public workers are protected more
generally from termination for engaging in associational activity counter

61 Id. at 519-2o.
62 Id. at 515.
63 Id. (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (972)). Justice Stevens also applied a type of strict scrutiny analysis in this case. See id.at 515-I6. ("[U]nless the government
can demonstrate 'an overriding interest,' . . .'of vital importance,' requiring that a person's
private beliefs conform to those of the hiring authority, his beliefs cannot be the sole basis for
depriving him of continued public employment") (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362,
368 (1976)).
64 Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
65 See id. at 74.
66 See id. at 78 ("Under our sustained precedent, conditioning hiring decisions on political belief and association plainly constitutes an unconstitutional condition, unless the government has a vital interest in doing so"). The Court also rejected that notion that these types
of employment decisions should somehow be treat differently because they did not have the
same impact on individual's First Amendment rights as an ultimate firing decision. See id. at
73 (finding that '[employees who find themselves in dead-end positions due to their political
backgrounds are adversely affected") (emphasis in original).
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to their government employers' wishes.67 The government employer in
these cases, for its part, seeks to protect legitimate business interests in
running an efficient workplace. Consequently, the strict scrutiny analysis
applied to government employer actions in the political association cases is
inappropriate. Instead, the question is one of government "reasonableness"
under all the circumstances and courts engage in a balancing of the relevant
employer and employee interests.6"
Although the public employee First Amendment framework was
initially established for free speech/free expression cases, a similar analysis
applies to freedom of association claims. 69 For public employees to make
out First Amendment retaliation claims based on their right to association,
the reasonableness of the public employer response must go through at
least a three-step analysis.7 0
67 See generally Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The
ConstitutionalizationofPublic Employee Rights to DecisionalNon-Interference in PrivateAffairs, 40
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 85, 95-105 (zoo6).
68 See Jonathan C. Medow, The FirstAmendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United
States, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 775, 816 (1982) ("Implicit in Pickeringseems to be a determination
that 'reasonableness' is the standard by which to judge the conditioning of public sector employment on a relinquishment of some measure of first amendment rights").
69 See, e.g., Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F3 d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2004); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,
178 F3d 231, 249 (4 th Cir. 1999); Ross v. Clayton County., 173 F3d 1305, 1310 (1 ith Cit.
1999).
70 There are two additional steps that may apply to the Pickeringframework in the context
of a public employee's associational claim. The Supreme Court gave the Pickering balancing
test an important additional gloss in the speech case of Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Connick requires that even before a Pickering balance can occur, a court had to consider as a
threshold matter whether the public employee was speaking on "a matter of public concern."
Id. at 15o. There is some dispute over whether an association claim must relate to a matter
of public concern before the Pickeringbalance applies. See Shrum v. City of Coweta, Okla.,
449 E3d 1132, 1138 n.3 (ioth Cir. 2oo6) (not reaching the question but observing that "[fQive
Circuits have adopted the public concern requirement for freedom of association claims and
two have not. See Hudson v. Craven, 403 E3d 691 ( 9 th Cir. 2005); Cobb, 363 F3d at 1O2-O3;
Edwards, 178 E3d at 249-50; Griffin v.Thomas, 929 F2d 1IO, 1214 (7th Cir. 1991); Boals v.
Gray, 775 F.2d 686 (6th Cir.1985). But see Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F3d 150, 157 n. 12
(5th Cir. 2ooo); Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. and Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (1ith Cir.
1987)"). The i ith Circuit recently reaffirmed its allegiance to the no public concern test faction. See Cook v. Gwinnett County School Dist., 414 E3d 1313 (i ith Cit. 2005). Regardless,
this difficult issue further supports the need for some unifying federal standard to decide
these Pickering association cases.
It is also unclear whether the recent decision in Garcettiv. Ceballos applies to associational
claims. 126 S. Ct. 1951, 196o (zoo6) ("[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline"). But
see D'Angelo v. School Bd. of Polk County, Fla., 497 F3d 1203 at 1212 (11 th Cir. 2007) (holding that Garcetti does apply to associational claim); Cindrich v. Fisher, No. 05-1348, 2007 WL
1576403, at *7 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2007) (same). If it does, it would require that the associational activity be engaged in as a citizen, as opposed as an employee. D'Angelo 497 E3d at
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First, if the employee can show that he or she is engaged in protected
associational activities, a court undertakes the Pickering balance of
interests. Under this balancing test, first developed in the public school
teacher case of Pickering v. Board of Education,7 a court weighs the First
Amendment interests of the employee as a citizen against the government
interest in running an efficient government service for the public.7" Here,
much emphasis is placed on whether the employee's association causes a
substantial disruption in the workplace.73 Substantial disruption, in turn, is
measured based on "the impact of the [conduct] on working relationships,
the harm caused by the [conduct], the public's interest in the [conduct], and
the employee's relationship to that issue."7 4 Paradoxically, this substantial
disruption standard appears to make most vulnerable those associations
which are the most unpopular and warrant the most protection under the
First Amendment.75 If the balance under Pickeringfavors the government,
the public employee has no First Amendment rights in association.
Second, if the Picketing balance favors the employee, the employee is
then considered to have engaged in protected activity. Next, under the
evidentiary framework established in Mount Healthy City School Districtv.
Doyle,76 the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
engaging in the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in
the adverse employment action that the employee suffered.77 This showing
may be based on both direct and circumstantial evidence that the most
likely reason the employee lost their job, was demoted, etc., was because
of the employee's associational activities.
Third, and finally, if the employee shows that the protected activity was
a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment decision, the
Government then has the burden of persuasion to show that it would have
made the same decision even in the absence of the protected conduct.78
If the public employer is successful in meeting this burden, there is again
no liability. This is because "[t]he constitutional principle at stake is
1213. The i i th Circuit concluded that Garcetti does apply to associational claims and requires
that a public employee not be acting as an employee pursuant to official duties in order to
have a First Amendment associational claim. Id. at 1213. This appears to be the first decision
on the issue and therefore, it remains to be seen whether other courts follow the I Ith Circuit
lead. Needless to say, the arrival of Garcetti further complicates this area of law.
71 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
72 Id. at 571-72.
73 Randy J. Kozel, ReconceptualizingPublic Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1007, 1o18
(2005).

74 Charles W. Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal

Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1173, 1177 (2007).
75 Kozel, supra note 73, at 1o8.
76 Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).

77 Id. at 287.
78 Id.
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sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a position
than if he had not engaged in the conduct."79 Only if the employee can
80
survive this third and last obstacle may liability be imposed.
This complicated framework highlights the difficulties public employees
have when they maintain that they were terminated from employment for
engaging in protected, associational activities. Nevertheless, these types of
associational rights are more secure then the developing rights to intimate
association described below.
II.

THE RIGHT TO INTIMATE ASSOCIATION IN THE WORKPLACE CONTEXT

Since Brandeis and Warren wrote their famous article in 1890 about
privacy rights,8 1 the only thing that commentators have seemed to agree
on concerning the right to privacy is that there is very little agreement
about its contours."2 But privacy rights developed under the substantive
due process component of the liberty interest in the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment83 also overlap with the right to
association. More specifically, the Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees" recognized a right to intimate association.8" The Roberts Court
defined the right to intimate association as the ability to form and maintain
human bonds unmolested by the State, concluding that, "[pirotecting these
[intimate] relationships from unwarranted state interference ... safeguards
the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any
concept of liberty."8 6 In short, the right of intimate association involves the

79 Id. at 285-86.

8o But even then, plaintiff-employees must deal with the intricacies of liability under
the federal civil rights statute, Section 1983,42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various sovereign immunity
doctrines. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo, 818 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known"). Questions regarding damages under Section 1983
and sovereign immunity are beyond the scope of this article.
81 See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Rightto Privacy,4 H~av. L. REV. 193 (189o).
82 See Daniel J.Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1o87, 1099-124 (2002)
(cataloging in depth the different conceptions of privacy that various courts and commentators have championed).
83 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (in the abortion context, locating a
woman's right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy within the liberty interest contained in the substantive component of the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (in a contraception case, finding
that "[the present case ... concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees").
84 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
85 Id. at 618-19.
86 Id. at 619.
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ability to engage in human relationships of all types.8 7
More recently, the parameters of that associational privacy right have
been expanded by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence
v. Texas.88 Prior to Lawrence, significant Supreme Court cases, such as
Bowers v. Hardwick, 9 appeared to discount the importance of such human
relationships. Bowers had held that there was no constitutional right to
engage in homosexual sodomy.'
In overturning Bowers, Lawrence's central holding was that the Texas
sodomy statute at issue furthered no legitimate state interest which could
justify the intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. 91
The most important constitutional innovation wrought by this holding is
the apparent attachment of some form of heightened scrutiny to the right
to be free from decisional interference in matters of an intimate nature. 9
Indeed, implicit in this holding is the need to balance individual privacy
93
interests against legitimate and substantial state interests.
Utilizing the Pickeringframework for these types of intimate associational
claims in the workplace,' I have developed a new framework for balancing
the employee's right as citizen to be free from unwanted and unjustified
governmental intrusions in the employee's personal and private life against
the government's interest as employer to run an efficient governmental
service for the benefit of the public. 95 At times, this balance will obviously
be strongly in favor of either the government or the employee, depending
on whether the employee's off-duty, private conduct has any impact on the
employer. If there is no impact, there is no "work-relatedness," 96 and the
87 See Solove, supra note 82, at 12 1. This conception of privacy "attempts to define
what aspects of life we should be able to restrict access to, or what information we should be
able to control or keep secret." Id.
88 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
89 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
90 Id.at 19o.
9' See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
92 See Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance ofBeing Lawrence, supra note 67, at 89.
93 See Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence's QuintessentialMillian Moment and its Impact on the
Doctrine of UnconstitutionalConditions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 117, 138 & n.98 (2005) (citing Dale
Carpenter, Symposium: Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, Is Lawrence Libertarian?,88 MINN.
L. REv. 1140, 1151 (2004)).
94 I refer to this right of intimate association in previous pieces as the right to "decisional non-interference in private affairs," borrowing Solove's formulation. See Secunda, The
(Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence, supranote 67, at 89 & n. 14 (citing Daniel J. Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477,491 (zoo6)).
95 Id. at 122-124 (describing the modified Pickering analysis for intimate association
claims).
96 See Cynthia L. Estlund, FreeSpeech Rights That Work at Work: From the FirstAmendment
to DueProcess, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1468 (2007) ("While that outer limit is a bit further from
the workplace than one might have expected, at some point along the spectrum of work-relatedness, the public employee apparently escapes the Connick-Pickering niche and recovers
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employee's interests will generally prevail.
For more intricate intimate association cases, it is helpful to consider
the "nexus test" used for employee discharges by labor arbitrators in the
union environment." The general principle is that an employer should not
be able to interfere with an employee's life outside of work unless there is
more than a de minimis adverse impact on the employer's work place.98 This
impact can be measured based on the detriment to the employer's public
image, the inability of the worker to interact with his or her co-employees,
or the simple inability of the employee to carry out the essential functions
of his or her position as a result of the private conduct.99 But outside of
these types of legitimate and substantial justifications for interference in
an employee's private life, a government employer should be constrained
by the liberty interest contained in the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from interfering
with the rights of intimate association of their employees.
Although this intimate association right has not been widely utilized
by courts in the United States, there are some encouraging signs. In a
recent state court case from North Carolina, a female sheriff dispatcher,
Debora Hobbs, was told by her supervising sheriff, Carson Smith, to marry
her live-in boyfriend, move out, or lose her job.10° The sheriff based his
actions on a state anti-cohabitation statute from 1805 and, in fact, the
female dispatcher lost her position when she refused to comply.01 The
dispatcher sued and won based on the court finding, in light of Lawrence
v. Texas, 02 that her firing unconstitutionally infringed her liberty interests
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 3 Although
her freedom as a citizen vis-a-vis the government").
97 See Paul M. Secunda, Getting to the Nexus of the Matter. A Sliding Scale Approach to
Faculty-Student Consensual Relationship Policies in Higher Education, 55 SYRAcusE L. REV. 55,

68-73 (2004).
98 See id. at 69; see also Kozel, supra note 73, at1051 (noting that the Supreme Court has
made a distinction in public employee speech cases based on whether the speech or expression in question included any indicia of the speaker's employment).
99 See Secunda, Gettingto the Nexus of the Matter,supra note 97, at 70 (citing W.E. Caldwell
Co., 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 434,436-37 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.)).
ioo See Steve Hartsoe, ACL U Challenges N.C. CohabitationLaw, WASH.PosT, May 10, 2005,
at Ao6.
ioi See Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence, supra note 67, at 131-32
(citing Hartsoe, supra note too).
102 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
103 See Hobbs v. Smith, No. 05 CVS 267, zoo6 WL 3103oo8, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct.,
Aug. 25, 2006); see also Andrea Weigl, Judge Rules Against Cohabitation Law, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 21, 2oo6,at AI, availableat http://www.newsobserver.com/loz/
story/462833.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007); Posting of Paul M. Secunda, North Carolina

Cohabitation Law Struck Down in Case of Female Sheriff Dispatcher, Workplace Prof Blog,
to http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof-bloglzoo6/o7/northcarolina_.html
(July 21,
2oo6).
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4
the court's exact reasoning does not appear to have been published,10
the strongest argument to support its holding is that a public employer
must have a substantial and legitimate interest before interfering with an
employee's right to intimate association.10
So, in addition to the more generic right to association found within the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, there are additional sources of
associational protections found under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process. In other words, there is a further layer of analysis
for both public employers to think about when making workplace decisions
potentially unrelated to the workplace and for employees to consider when
shielding themselves from their public employer's overreaching.
Yet, there is a further complication caused by the recent development of
an aggressive expansion of expressive association rights for organizations,
including public and private employers. It is that subject that this article
now considers in its various dimensions.

III.

THE RIGHT TO EXPRESSIVE AssocIATION
IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

The landmark case of Roberts v. UnitedStates Jaycees,106 not only introduced
the conception of intimate association, but it broke new ground in freedom
of association cases by introducing an instructive dichotomy. In Roberts,
Justice Brennan divided all previous constitutional association cases into
two categories. On the one hand, the right to intimate association, which
concerns rights to personal liberty located within the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 07 On the other hand, the right to expressive
association, which involves association for the promotion of rights found
primarily within the First Amendment. 1°8 The nature and degree of
constitutional protection depends for what purpose the organization
engages in associational activities. 10
In Roberts, the state interference at issue involved the application of
Minnesota's state public accommodations statute's gender discrimination
provisions to the membership policies of the Jaycees, which did not grant

IO4 See Judge Rules N.C. Anti-Cohabitation Law Unconstitutional,USA TODAY (July 21,
2oo6), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2oo6-o7-21-cohabitation-x.htm
("State Superior Court Judge Benjamin Alford issued the ruling late Wednesday, saying the
law violated Hobbs' constitutional right to liberty. He cited the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court case
titled Lawrencev. Texas, which struck down a Texas sodomy law").
105 See Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence, supra note 67, at I 16.
io6 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 6o9 (1984).
107 Id. at 617-18.
io8 Id. at 618.
io9 Id.
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women full membership in their organization."' The Court first explained
that the Jaycees was not an intimate association because of its size, lack of
selectivity in defining group membership, and its generally open, public
nature."' Having eliminated intimate association from consideration, the
Court recognized the Jaycees as a type of expressive association whose
members affiliated with one another to advocate certain views."'
In this regard, the Court stated, "we have long understood as implicit
in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety
of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.", 3
The Court went on to conclude that "[in view of the various protected
activities in which the Jaycees engages ... that right is plainly implicated in
this case."' 14 Jaycees' activities are described later in the opinion as taking
public positions on a number of diverse issues and regularly engaging "in
a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities
worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment.""'
Some sixteen years later, a newly constituted Supreme Court had the
opportunity to develop further the expressive association doctrine in the
form of Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale,'16 in which the Court found in favor of

IIO Id.at 612-17.
i Id
I. at 620-2 i. Not surprisingly, the Court also found employers do not have rights of
intimate association when selecting employees. See id.at 620 ("[Tlhe Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the selection of one's spouse that
would not apply to regulations affecting the choice of one's fellow employees").
112 Id. at 622. Even though the Court concluded that the Jaycees had expressive association rights and those rights were significantly burdened by the application of the public accommodation statute, the Court nevertheless held that the State's compelling interest
in eradicating gender discrimination justified the infringement on the group's rights. Id at
622-23.
113 Id. at 622.
114 Id.
115 Id.at 626-27. Contrary to Justice Brennan's dichotomy, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts suggests that non-intimate association cases should be further broken down
into expressive association and commercial association cases to accord sufficient protection
to expressive associations, while at the same time placing appropriate burdens on groups
claiming the protection of the First Amendment for commercial association purposes. Id.
at 632 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Whereas those associations that were predominantly expressive were due substantial protection from governmental interference, O'Connor argued
that commercial associations were largely non-expressive and, therefore, state regulation was
permissible as long as it was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Id. at
633-35. Nevertheless, O'Connor does recognize that "[m]any associations cannot readily be
described as purely expressive or purely commercial" and that "[t]he standard for deciding
just how much of an association's involvement in commercial activity is enough to suspend
the association's First Amendment right to control its membership cannot... be articulated
with simple precision." Id. at 635.
1I6 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2ooo).
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the Boy Scouts' expressive association claims." 7 In an opinion written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the New Jersey state public
accommodations statute impermissibly infringed on the. Scouts' expressive
association rights by requiring them to have a gay assistant scoutmaster as
a member." 8
The Court began its analysis by asking whether the Boy Scouts engaged
in expressive activity, cautioning that "a group must engage in some form of
expression, whether it be public or private."" 9 The Court then examined
the record, including the Boy Scouts' mission statement, and concluded
that its mission was "to instill values in young people," including the values
of being "morally straight" and "clean." 2 0 Based on this mission, the Court
seems indisputable that an association that2 seeks to
concluded that, "[i]t
transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity."' '
The Court then deferred to the group's description of both its message
concerning being anti-homosexual and its belief that having a gay assistant
scoutmaster would substantially impair its message of living a "morally
straight" and "clean" life.' Finally, given the severity of the intrusion into
the Scouts' rights to expressive association, the Court held that their First
Amendment rights prevailed. 3
Although neither Dale nor Roberts involved employers asserting
expressive association rights, previous Supreme Court cases make it clear
that employers, both public and private, have expressive association rights.
This conclusion is based on an earlier right-to-association opinion in
Hishon v. King & Spalding,' 4 which concerned an allegedly unlawful gender
discriminatory law firm partnership decision under the federal employment
discrimination law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.125 One of the
law firm's arguments was that requiring them to take an employee into
partnership would interfere with the law firm's rights to association.2 6 In
other words, the law firm should not be forced to take into membership
those partners it did not want.
The Court, however, rejected this argument. Finding that the law firm

117 Id. at 659.
i18 Id. at 656-59.
119 Id. at 648.
o
dissenting) ("Beyond the single
izo See id. at 648-5 . But see id. at 675 (Stevens, J.,
sentence in these policy statements, there is no indication of any shared goal of teaching that
homosexuality is incompatible with being 'morally straight' and 'clean"').
121 See id.at 650 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
122 See id.at 651-53.
123 See id.at 65 7-59.
124 Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
125 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe-17 (zooo).
126

Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78.
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only had a right to association consistent with the "distinctive contribution
... to the ideas and beliefs of our society" that lawyers make through their
activities," 7 the Court could not see how considering the female partnership
candidate on her merits as opposed to her sex would interfere with these
Hishon thus appears to stand for two propositions
association rights.'
when it comes to expressive association claims by employers: (1) under
appropriate circumstances, such rights may exist, and (2) the employer
conduct in question has to be somehow connected to the expressive
purpose of the organization. The law firm failed under the second prong in
Hishon because being female had nothing to do with the ability to adhere
to and propagate the ideas and beliefs of the firm.
Although there have not yet been many cases in which employers have
sought to overcome countervailing employee civil liberties or civil rights
through use of expressive association claims, there is some indication that
more cases may be on the way. In a brief filed in the Title VII case of
Curay-Cramerv. UrsulineAcademy of Wilmington,2 9 a Catholic school argued
that as an expressive association it should not be required to maintain in
employment a teacher who signed a pro-choice advertisement in the local
newspaper. 30 The Third Circuit's decision in Curay-Cramer,however,
found for the school on other grounds and did not address the expressive
association argument."' There has also been recent academic commentary
on the issue, supporting the idea that religiously oriented private employers
should be able to use such rights to overcome contrary antidiscrimination
laws.'3

The recognition of expressive association rights for employers would
entail a vast accretion of employer power to potentially exclude unpopular,
controversial, or just plain disagreeable employees from the workplace.
Expressive association rights not only undermine employee's rights of
association, which must be necessarily diminished by the recognition of
a similar right for employers, but also such "liberty" rights are counter to
antidiscrimination laws which push the "equality" rights of employees.
33
And unlike the association rights discussed under Pickering previously,1
this constitutional right is not limited to the public sector and therefore,
127

Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,431 (1963)).

128 Id.

Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, 450 F3d 130 (3d Cir. zoo6).
130 See id.; Brief of Appellees the Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, 2005 WL 49o6187
129

(Mar.

24, 2005),

at 35-39.

131 SeeCuray-Craer,450 E3d at 142.
132 See Julie Manning Magid & Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Religious and Associational
Freedoms of Business Owners, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 191, 192-93 (2005) (arguing that recent
free exercise, hybrid rights, and associational cases decided by the Supreme Court support
religiously devoted employers' rights to promote religion and disassociate from individuals
who do not share their beliefs without violating antidiscrimination laws).
133 See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
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could have a much larger impact on the right to association in the American
workplace.
Because of this developing state of affairs, I have offered in a previous
piece an alternative vision which denies public employers constitutional
rights to association, but would permit public employer interests to be
recognized under the existing Pickering framework. 13 4 In other words,
the governmental interests recognized in Picketing are not in any sense
constitutional rights, but rather recognition of the interests a government
employer has in maintaining "a significant degree of control over their
employees' words and actions" because "without it, there would be little
chance for the efficient provision of public services.""13 The balance
undertaken in Pickering is required because even though the government
employer performs "important public functions,"'36 and consequently
possesses far broader powers in its employer capacity than in its sovereign
capacity; 3 ' nevertheless, "a citizen who works for the government is
nonetheless a citizen."138
Similarly, the interests that public employers have in conveying
and advocating certain views and maintaining the core values of their
institutions may be seen as more akin to Pickering efficiency interests
than a First Amendment right to expressive association.'39 As the Garcetti
Court observed: "Supervisors must ensure that their employees' official
communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote
the employer' mission.'' 14° In setting out the relevant interests, the Court
utilizes the language of efficiency interests, not of employer expressive
41
association rights.'
134 See generally Paul M. Secunda, The Solomon Amendment, Expressive Associations, and
PublicEmployment, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1767 (2007). Of course, private employers, like the law
firm in Hishon, would not come under Pickeringbecause of the lack of state action. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text. To the extent that private employers have been found to have
expressive association rights, those rights might be impermissibly burdened by application
of a statutory scheme like Title VII. See Magid & Prenkert, supra note 132, at 192-93. This
is yet another layer of complexity to add to the burgeoning varieties of rights to association
claims in the workplace.
135 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (zoo6) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 143 (2003)).
136 See id.at 1959 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987)).
137 See supra note 33-41 and accompanying text.
138 See Garcetti,126 S. Ct. at 1958.
139 See id. at 1960 ("Employers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by
an employee in his or her professional capacity. Official communications have official consequences, creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity").
140 Id. (emphasis added).
141 The absence of Dale and Roberts from the Garceti opinion is particularly telling. One
would expect that if public employers were thought to have expressive association rights the
Court would have explored that issue in Garcetti. See Secunda, The Solomon Amendment, supra
note 134, at 18o9.
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Based on this governmental interests analysis, if a public employer
wishes not to hire a prospective employee because that employee has
engaged in controversial associations, intimate or otherwise, the proper
analysis is not to suggest that the government has a constitutional right as an
expressive association to disassociate itself from those individuals it deems
are promoting antithetical messages. Rather, a court should determine
whether the constitutional rights of the individual cannot be recognized
4
without substantially disrupting the public employer's enterprise. 1
This proposed analysis is more consistent with constitutional doctrine in
the public employer area and does not take the unprecedented step of
1 43
suggesting that government employers have First Amendment rights.
But whether my expressive association analysis or intimate association
analysis is adopted by courts one day or not, this article thus far has
hopefully accomplished one overarching goal: to establish that the freedom
of association just in its constitutional dimensions, not even to mention its
statutory and common law incarnations, is a hopeless array of confusing,
contradictory, and just plan dumbfounding legal doctrine. It is time to
consider alternatives.' Congress through its interstate commerce power has
just the ability to bring some semblance of order to this jurisprudential
mess.
IV.

PROPOSAL: THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
IN THE WORKPLACE ACT

The proposal made in this Part stems from the idea that it would be better
in this area of the law if courts could avoid deciding tricky freedom of
association constitutional doctrine and instead ground their decisions on
appropriate statutory grounds.1" Although there is currently no universal
freedom of association in the workplace legislation, 4 ' Congress is well
142 I do not mean to suggest that the Pickering balance does not have its own shortcomings. Its reliance on determining constitutional rights based on whether a public employee's
conduct causes his or her employer substantial disruption is close to approaching the constitutionalization of the heckler's veto. See Kozel, supra note 73, at ioi8 ("Such a test is inconsistent with the notion of robust exchange of divergent ideas, as it leaves vulnerable the speech
that is most likely to have a strong effect").
143 The most persuasive argument against finding that public employers have expressive association rights is a structural one. It is simply this: the Bill of Rights is about protecting
the rights of the governed, not the governing. See Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment protects the press
from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government").
144 Lowe v S.E.C., 472 U.S. I8I, I9O (1985) ("[We should 'not decide a constitutional
question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case"') (quoting Escambia
County, Florida v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48,51 (1984) (per curiam)); see also Atkins v. Parker, 472
U.S. I 15, 123 (1985); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
145 For instance, Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act only applies to private
employers and does not concern associational activities of workers that are not labor-oriented.
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within its commerce clause power '46 to enact such minimum-conditionsin-the-workplace legislation as long as the provisions do not otherwise
violate the Constitution.'47
Congress should be able to protect workers from being harassed and
intimidated by employers from exercising their associational rights as a
minimal working condition. Or put differently, Congress should be able to
enact laws that prohibit employers from firing workers who refuse to give
up their desired associations at their employer's request. It is also clear
that Congress has employed this legislative power to bar illicit causes for
discharge under federal anti-discrimination law.'48
Using this power, and after making the necessary jurisdictional
finding that, "the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary
infringement of employees' rights to association, burdens commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce," 149 such a federal statute would simply
state: "All employees are guaranteed freedom of association inside and
outside the workplace, unless the employer can demonstrate legitimate and
substantial business reasons for impinging on such employee freedoms."
This proposed bill, the Freedom of Association in the Workplace Act
(FAWA), would be jurisdictionally sound and would codify a version of the
Pickeringanalysis for all forms of employee claims to associational rights. By
using the word "substantial" as far as the employer's burden in overcoming
the employee's associational rights, Congress would be placing its thumb
intentionally on the employee's side of the balance and going beyond
what the Constitution requires so that such fundamental rights could not
be impinged upon based on de minimis workplace disruption grounds.
Consistent with Title VII, the word "demonstrate," as far as the employer's
burden in these cases, would mean "meets the burdens of production and

See Eastex Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556,567-68 (1978) (limiting protected conduct under section 7 to concerted activity that bears a "relationship to employees' interests as employees").
146 In addition, the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8 ("The Congress shall have
Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes"), has been interpreted to give Congress an almost limitless right to legislate
in the labor relations area. Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees Int'l Union Local 54,468 U.S.
491 , 501 (984); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. ((937); see also Howell
Chevrolet Co. v. N.L.R.B., 346 U.S. 482 (1953) (upholding application of NLRA to small local
retailers of automobiles).
147 Contrary state laws would not be an issue as a result of the operation of the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONsT. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme
Law of the Land").
148 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ zoooe-i 7 (2ooo);
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2ooo); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
149 This jurisdictional language is based on that found in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (2000).
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persuasion." 10
FAWA would staunch the current harms being caused to both employees
and employers by the current freedom of association legal scheme.
Employees would no longer suffer because the scope of their associational
rights hinge on irrelevant factors, such as the public or unionized nature of
their workplace. At the same time, employers, especially public employers,
would not need to be constantly vigilant that some form of associational
right of their employees is being implicated by their workplace decisions.''
They instead can gain the desired predictability once they become familiar
with the parameters of the new law."'5
The proposed legislation would also have advantages over existing
statutory frameworks that protect associational rights to more limited
degrees. The proposed federal bill would apply to public workers and
would extend the associational protections to all types of membership
organizations and associational activities, not just to formation of unions or
other labor-related activities.15 3 Unlike a number of recently enacted state
laws that protect legal, off-duty conduct of employees, " 4 FAWA would have
all the benefits that come with being a uniform federal law that applies in
the same manner in all fifty states.'
Two further provisions would fill out the contours of this new legislation.
Because there is already a well-defined scope of associational protection
under existing constitutional law, the proposed legislation should also
contain a provision stating: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to apply
a lesser standard than the standards applied currently to rights of association
under the U.S. Constitution." 51 6 Nonetheless, an additional provision
150 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (2000).

151 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination:RegulatoryPragmatismin the Workplace (Nov.
26, 2007), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-io32667 ("[Workplace] laws create a significant
burden, as employers must determine which of these often complicated rules apply and how
to satisfy the ones that do").
152 To the extent that the new law has some interpretative problems, Congress can always go back and amend the law to respond to whatever issues arise. It is certainly easier to
change legal principles when they derive from statutory law rather than from constitutional
law.
153 So the proposed bill would provide more associational protection than section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act. See supranote 144 and accompanying text.
154 States with broad off-duty conduct statutes currently include Colorado, North
Dakota, California, and New York. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(i) (2007); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to -03 (2007); CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 2OI-d(z) (2007).

Additionally, a Connecticut statute protects employees, both on-duty and off-duty, from suffering adverse employment consequences for engaging in First Amendment-type activities.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (2007).

155 Hirsch, supra note 1i ("In the past, relying on state and local regulation of the
workplace made sense. However, the lack of vertical integration makes far less sense in the
modern economy. Many employers are at least regional, if not national, in scope").
156 This language is based on similar language in the Americans with Disabilities Act
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would make clear that federal, state, and local decisionmakers are free to go
beyond the floor of FAWA and provide additional associational protections
if they so wish: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to invalidate or limit
the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any State
or political subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or
equal protection for the associational rights of employees that are afforded
by this Act."' 57
CONCLUSION

It is time to rethink how the United States enforces the right of association
in the workplace. The proliferation of political associational rights,
workplace associational rights, intimate association rights, and expressive
association rights in the constitutional sphere over the last thirty years has
made the scope of this fundamental civil liberty confusing and hard to
enforce. Outside of the constitutional framework, which generally applies
only to public employees, low union density and the lack of common law
associational claims have made private sector employees' associational
rights vulnerable. The unfortunate consequence is that American
workers currently enjoy less associational freedoms than almost any other
industrialized nation in the world.
The proposed federal Freedom of Association in the Workplace Act
(FAWA) would not supplant existing constitutional and statutory protections
at the federal and state level, but would provide a complementary and
comprehensive statutory framework for all associational rights claims
in the workplace. Such a law would provide additional protection for
employee associational claims both procedurally and substantively, while
simultaneously making consideration of the more difficult constitutional
issues by courts unnecessary. If appropriately drafted and implemented,
such a law would provide a uniform and understandable basis for
guaranteeing workplace freedom of association.
More particulars for such federal legislation still need to be supplied
and thought through. 158 The purpose of this article, however, has been
to highlight the technicolor nature of the right to association in American
labor and employment law and to suggest that the time is ripe to bring some
semblance of order through federal legislation to protect this foundational

concerning its relationship to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 42 U.S.C. § 1220i(a) (2007).
157 This provision is again based on similar language in the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Id. § 1220(b).
158 For instance, should an independent federal agency administratively hear such associational claims or should employees have the right to bring a private cause of action directly
into state or federal court? What types of damages should be available and should incentives
be set up so that employer and employees self-educate about the scope of associational rights
in the workplace?
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right of a free society."s9

159 "There are no countries in which associations are more needed, to prevent the despotism of faction or the arbitrary power of a prince, than those which are democratically constituted." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 98 (Richard D. Heffner ed., New
American Library, 1956) (1835).

